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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 04-3266
                    
YVONNE WATKINS
o/b/o Roland Offley
   v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
     Yvonne Watkins,
                                      Appellant
                    
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
D.C. Civil No. 01-cv-04351
District Judge:  The Honorable William J. Martini
                    
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 7, 2005  
                    
Before: BARRY, AMBRO, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
                    
(Filed:  May 3, 2005)
                    
OPINION
                    
2BARRY, Circuit Judge
 This is an appeal from a final order of the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey affirming the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“Commissioner”).  The Commissioner denied the application filed by
Yvonne Watkins (“Watkins”) on behalf of her grandson, Roland Offley (“Roland”), for
supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. 
The primary issue raised in this appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the
conclusion that Roland is not disabled.
I.  BACKGROUND
Because we write only for the benefit of the parties, we will limit our discussion to
those facts bearing directly on our disposition of this appeal.  The District Court had
jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).  We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We must affirm the District Court if it correctly found the
decision of the Commissioner to be supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. §
405(g); Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004).  Substantial evidence means
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 503 (internal quotations omitted).  
Watkins initially filed an application for SSI benefits on her grandson’s behalf. 
The application claimed that Roland was disabled due to asthma, residual lead poisoning,
and disruptive behavior.  This application was denied twice.  After the second denial,
     The parties seem to agree that Roland’s asthma and residual lead poisoning do not1
rise to the level of severe impairments.
     The child may also satisfy this requirement by showing an extreme limitation in one2
category.  Roland does not contend that he has an extreme limitation in any category.
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Watkins requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). 
20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a)-(d) sets out the three-step sequential analysis for
determining child disability.  Under this analysis, a child is deemed disabled if: (1) he or
she is not working and not engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) he or she has a
medically determinable impairment that is severe; and (3) the medically determinable
severe impairment meets, medically equals, or functionally equals a listing (“Listings”) in
20 C.F.R. Part 404, subpart P, Appendix 1.  The ALJ found, and the parties do not
dispute, that Roland was not working and that his attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(“ADHD”) and speech/language delay were medically documented and amounted to a
severe impairment.   The ALJ, therefore, concluded that the first two prongs of § 416.9241
were satisfied. 
The ALJ next examined whether Roland’s severe impairment satisfied § 416.924's
third prong. To determine if a child’s ADHD meets or equals the Listings, it must be
shown that that medically documented condition results in marked limitations in at least
two of the following four categories:  (1) age-appropriate cognitive/communicative2
functioning; (2) age-appropriate social functioning; (3) age appropriate personal
functioning; and (4) difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.  See 20
4C.F.R. Part 404, subpt. P, app. 1, part B § 112.11.  A child has a marked limitation when
his or her impairments seriously interfere with the ability to independently initiate,
sustain, or complete activities.  Id. at § 112.00(C).  
The ALJ found that the record did not document the level of severity required by §
112.11(B), and specifically noted those areas in which evidence was lacking.  The ALJ,
therefore, concluded that Roland’s impairment did not meet or equal the criteria of any
impairment described in the Listing of Impairments of Appendix 1.
If a child’s impairment (or combination of impairments) does not meet or
medically equal the severity of an impairment contained in the Listings, the
Commissioner must then assess whether the impairment is “functionally equivalent” to a
listed impairment.  See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b).  In order to assess functional
equivalence, as relevant here the Commissioner was required to consider Roland’s age
and evaluate the effect of his impairment in several broad areas of development or
functioning.  For the impairment to functionally equal “listing-level” severity, it must
result in marked limitations in at least two of the following areas of functioning:
cognitive/communicative; social; personal; and concentration, persistence and pace.  See
20 C.F.R. 416.926a(c)(4) (2000).  The ALJ found that Roland’s impairment was not
functionally equivalent to an impairment contained in the Listings because Roland either
had no limitation or, in those areas where he did have a limitation, that limitation was less
than marked.  Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Roland was not disabled. 
5II.  DISCUSSION
Relying on Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1981), Roland argues that the
ALJ failed to articulate an evidentiary basis for his conclusion that Roland’s
cognition/communication, social functioning and concentration limitations were “less
than marked” and did not meet or medically equal the criteria of Listing §112.11(B). 
Contrary to this assertion, the ALJ did point to specific evidence that supported his
conclusion – in particular, that Roland’s teacher reported he had no problems with
articulation, he was generally able to complete tasks assigned, and he had no problems
with gross motor coordination. 
Moreover, as the District Court correctly observed, the ALJ’s opinion discussed in
detail whether Roland has a “broad functional limitation.”  Because the analysis required
to see if there is a broad functional limitation essentially mirrors the analysis under §
111.12(B), the ALJ did, in fact, provide an adequate explanation for why Roland’s
impairment did not meet or medically equal any of the Listings. 
Roland argues, next, that substantial evidence shows that he has marked
cognition/communication, social functioning and concentration limitations that
“functionally equal” the Listings.  He points to his score in the tenth percentile in
expressive communication, his school reports that do not indicate that he is “making
progress in the social sphere,” and the fact that the ALJ failed to address contrary
evidence of his “marked concentration” deficit.  Roland concludes by observing that the
6ALJ’s refusal to address such contradictory evidence is not “merely [a] Cotter violation,
[but is a] Cotter outrage.” Brief at 12. 
We disagree.  The ALJ observed that the only evidence indicating that Roland may
have a marked limitation in expressive communication was scoring in the ninth and tenth
percentile in auditory comprehension and expressive communication tests, and being
classified in pre-school as having deficits in language and speech.  Section
416.926a(e)(4)(I) states, however, that no single piece of information can in isolation
establish that a child has a marked limitation.  Rather, the ALJ is to consider test scores
together with other information, such as classroom reports, to see if the “child’s
functioning in day-to-day activities is not seriously or very seriously limited by [his]
impairments.”§ 416.926a(e)(4)(ii)(B).  
The ALJ concluded that Roland does not have a marked limitation in expressive
communication for the following reasons.  First, a State agency physician who evaluated
him opined that while he has a moderate limitation in cognitive functioning, no evidence
existed that he had a marked communicative limitation.  Second, Roland’s teacher
reported that he had no problems with articulation.  Third, Roland’s cognitive abilities,
according to a Stanford Binet test, are average. Finally, a speech pathologist reported that
his “speech intelligibility was good to fair in all contexts.” App. at 127. 
With reference to Roland’s argument that substantial evidence does not support the
ALJ’s conclusion that he has a less than marked limitation in social functioning, the ALJ
7noted that the only evidence suggesting Roland is struggling socially was his
grandmother’s testimony that he has problems with other children at school.  This
testimony was, however, called into question by Roland’s teacher, who stated that he has
made progress in socialization, has made friends, and was engaging in a level of activity
typical for a four-year old. 
Roland’s final argument is that he has a marked limitation in concentration
because his ADHD “prevents him from mustering the requisite concentration to perform
at anywhere near his grade level.”  Brief at 9.  He also contends that the ALJ failed to
address his teacher’s claim that he has an attention span that “is extremely short.” Id. at
10.  While the ALJ did not cite this particular evidence, he did observe that Roland has
“moderate (less than marked) limitations in the function of concentration, persistence, and
pace.” App. at 15 (emphasis in original).  Moreover, while Roland’s ADHD has caused
him to have difficulty concentrating, the ALJ noted that Roland does not take his
prescribed Ritalin.  Indeed, he noted that, even without the medication, Roland, according
to his teacher, has made progress in school and is now capable of completing tasks that he
is asked to perform.  Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion
that Roland’s concentration problems are less than marked – his “day-to-day activities
[are] not seriously or very seriously limited by [his] impairments.”§ 416.926a(e)(4)(ii)(B). 
III.  CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
